Shoot first, talk later in Myanmar

Posted at: Asia times
By Brian McCartan

MAE SOT, Thailand - Fighting between government forces and ethnic rebel groups in Myanmar's Karen State has in recent weeks pushed thousands of refugees into neighboring Thailand. The upsurge in hostilities stems from the military regime's drive to transform the ethnic ceasefire armies into government-controlled border guards and in the process assert central control in the contested territories ahead of general elections scheduled for 2010.

Attacks led by the government-aligned Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and supported by Myanmar army soldiers commenced on June 2 against the Karen National Liberation Army's (KNLA) battalions and general headquarters, situated along the Thai-Myanmar border. The offensive has shifted international media attention away from the trial of pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi and short-circuited a recent Thai diplomatic overture to mediate a ceasefire between the government and insurgent group.

The struggle between the insurgent Karen and Myanmar's ruling military junta has ground on for 60 years, making it the world's longest-running insurgency. Fighting along the Thai-Myanmar border has been a source of friction between the two Southeast Asian countries, especially since Myanmar's military has asserted greater control over long-contested border regions.

Some analysts contend that's raised the temperature of a long-time regional security hot spot, made hotter in recent years by frequent cross-border incursions and shoot-outs often involving drug traffickers. The recent scaled-up attacks will no doubt have been noticed in Washington.

Officials in President Barack Obama's administration had earlier promised a policy review towards Myanmar, whose abysmal rights record has been met with a raft of US economic and financial sanctions. Any move towards conciliation that is undermined by the launch of the controversial trial against Suu Kyi and the intensified military assault on the Karen is expected to bolster Congressional critics of any move to relieve pressure on the regime.

The plight of Myanmar's ethnic minorities has won increased attention in the US, including a visit to a Karen refugee camp by then-first lady Laura Bush in August 2008. The Karen's position has been made more desperate by a series of battlefield reversals, starting with the fall of the insurgent group's political arm's Karen National Union (KNU) headquarters in 1995. The defeats have gradually diminished the once large territory under control of the the KNLA's 7th Brigade to a small number of border enclaves near the small Thai town of Mae Salit.

The KNLA's misfortunes stemmed largely from the December 1994 creation of the breakaway DKBA, which promptly allied itself with the Myanmar government. With its inside knowledge of the KNU/KNLA's structure and strategy, the armed group swiftly seized control of large areas in central and southern Karen State. Human-rights groups have accused the DKBA of various rights abuses, including summary executions, torture and forced labor. New allegations have surfaced with the latest offensive.

The ruling junta has bid to portray the new fighting as a purely ethnic-on-ethnic issue and denied any involvement in the offensive. A press statement by Myanmar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs released on June 13 claimed, "As a matter of fact, the fighting took place between the two armed groups - DKBA and KNU/KNLA. Members of the government armed forces had no role whatsoever in the recent scuffles."

Senior KNLA military officers who spoke with Asia Times Online claimed that Myanmar army units are in reality deeply involved in the ongoing military operation by committing around 2,000-2,500 troops from two battalions of the Southeast Regional Command and six battalions of the 22nd Light Infantry Division to the attack.

To obfuscate those deployments, an estimated 500 DKBA troops from its 333rd, 555th and 999th Brigades have been stationed on the frontline as an assault force, while the Myanmar army units have been positioned behind them. Those government forces have in recent weeks provided external security, evacuated casualties, transported food and ammunition and given artillery support to the DKBA.

Although heavier artillery is believed to be stationed in the area, the army has restricted shelling to smaller caliber mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, known to be used by the DKBA. KNLA sources claim that around 150 DKBA and Myanmar army troops have been killed and wounded, many from landmines, in the new fighting. Hospitals in the Myanmar border villages of Ko Ko and Meh Th'Waw are reportedly full of wounded DKBA soldiers.

After several weeks of fighting, the KNLA decided late last week to withdraw most of their troops stationed at border camps in favor of conducting hit-and-run guerrilla attacks. The tactic, they say, will reduce their own casualties and allow attacks from behind on the Myanmar army while protecting Karen civilians, who would inevitably be caught in the crossfire of a DKBA frontal ground attack against the KNLA's entrenched positions.

An estimated 4,000 refugees have fled the fighting in the areas, although exact figures vary between the Thai government, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Karen relief organizations. Refugees are currently living in seven sites along the Thai-Myanmar border, but Thai government officials have said they will consolidate these into three sites in the coming days. Most of the refugees are woman and children, many under the age of 13, according to NGOs monitoring the situation.

DKBA officers have reportedly told village leaders and at least one Thai military officer overseeing the area that the refugees can safely return to Myanmar. "The villagers want to stay in their area," said Nan Paw Ghay of the Karen Information Center (KIC), a rights advocacy situated on the Thai-Myanmar border. "But they are afraid it is a trick and they will be used as forced labor."

One villager interviewed by KIC escaped on June 7 from being forced to serve as a porter to carry mortar ammunition for the DKBA. He said that other forced porters were told by DKBA commander Colonel Maung Chit Thu that they had been recruited to build a pagoda. Others were told that they were tapped to work in a rubber plantation, according to the villager.

The Karen Human Rights roup (KHRG) claims that around 50 villagers initially fled the fighting, but their numbers soon swelled as hundreds of others fled due to fears they would be forced to haul ammunition or be used as human minesweepers. Saw Em Wee, a 43-year-old Karen villager, said, "The Burmese army came to both sides of our village. We were afraid to be used as porters or to walk in front [to sweep for landmines], so we fled.

Muddied motivations
Military operations in Myanmar typically are mounted in the dry season, when roads and mountain trails are dry and units may be more easily supplied. Driven during the rainy season, the current offensive is strategically unusual and the timing of the attacks has generated much speculation among KNLA leaders and border watchers.

That includes theories that the junta wants to consolidate its control in the area before the controversial 2010 elections. Some political analysts believe the junta also wants to put pressure on the Thai government for its critical stance towards the ongoing trial of pro-democracy icon Suu Kyi, who has spent 13 of the past 19 years under house arrest.

The recent attacks have overtly undermined recent attempts by Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya to broker ceasefire talks between the KNU and the Myanmar government. Although the KNU agreed to negotiations in April during a meeting with Kasit, apparently at the request of Myanmar Prime Minister Thein Sein, no follow-up contacts have been made, according to the KNU. Senior KNU leaders, including Vice President David Thakabaw and Joint Secretary-1 Major Hla Ngwe, said that the renewed attacks prove the Myanmar government was never serious about negotiations.

Indeed, it could work to the government's strategic advantage to ramp-up hostilities, particularly if it were successful in driving a weakened KNLA into the mountainous and remote Papun township, where it would have a more tenuous supply and information line to Thailand. Trapped in the mountains, the KNLA would present little strategic threat to the regime, while an ongoing low-level insurgency would provide pretext to maintain a large standing army and draconian political policies in the area, even after the introduction of purported democratic rule after the 2010 elections.

KNU and KNLA officers, for their part, discount the notion that the current offensive against their positions is directly connected to the upcoming 2010 general elections. The KNU has labeled the upcoming elections a "sham" in statements and media interviews, and called on the international community to shy from endorsing them. In a June 8 statement on the fighting, the KNU called for a tripartite dialogue between the regime, ethnic groups and the democracy movement to foster national reconciliation in advance of political changes.

In contrast to other ceasefire groups in the Shan State, the DKBA has not maintained a political wing since 1995, nor is it expected to form one for the upcoming elections. One KNU source, however, speculated that while some DKBA members may stand in the upcoming election, the ruling junta has likely already decided who will win in the area.

Yet others see a connection between the attacks and preparations for the polls, including the government's controversial new Border Guard Force (BGF) program. The surrender or transformation of ethnic armed groups into so-called border guard units under the control of the Myanmar army is a government-stated prerequisite for holding the general elections in border areas.

The DKBA represents the largest ceasefire group to accede to the junta's proposal to transform its militia into a border guard force. Other major ceasefire groups, including in the Shan State, Kachin State and Mon State, have all rejected the junta's proposal, stating that they favor maintaining their own armies and political control over previously agreed territory, and would prefer to wait until after the elections before deciding whether to join any government initiatives in their areas.

Military makeover
Under the BGF program, ethnic armies will be placed under a department of the Myanmar army. The program will be overseen by an administrative committee and under operational control of another committee, both staffed by Myanmar army officers. The new 326-man border battalions will be largely made up of ethnic soldiers and officers, although with Myanmar army officers in key positions.

All training, weapons and salaries will be provided by the army and as part of the agreement the new battalions must replace their individual ethnic army names and badges with new patches that bear the BGF logo. Analysts see the transformation as a way of emasculating the ethnic groups by removing their armed wings from control of their political organizations.

According to the junta's logic, analysts say, once "disciplined democracy" is in place following the general elections, there will be no need for the ethnic groups to maintain armies in a peaceful democracy where cooperative economic development is prioritized. In reality, the ethnic minority border areas will not be demilitarized and in some areas will likely have an even greater military presence.

Minutes from a May 15 meeting of DKBA commanders indicate that the armed group intends to expand its force from its current estimated 3,000 troops to around 9,000 as part of the BGF transformation process. Conscription began in April and, according to a KHRG report, was stepped up after the May meeting.

The move has reportedly been unpopular among the DKBA's rank and file and DKBA officers have threatened to arrest those who refuse to join for a required three-year enlistment period. Some analysts say the timing of the current offensive may have also aimed at keeping DKBA officers critical of the BGF transformation occupied until the deadline has passed.

Others see economic motivations. The border region has in recent years seen increased investment in contract farming for corn, rubber and other crops. There are also long planned economic zones in the works for the Hlaing Bwe area, directly to the west of the current fighting. Karen sources say key DKBA commander Maung Chit Thu has announced that he plans to build a "proper road" from Hlaing Bwe town to the border town of Mae Salit to stimulate cross-border trade.

As part of their initial ceasefire deal, the DKBA was given economic concessions to develop Karen State and its border areas. That presumably included the right to smuggle and traffic unimpeded narcotics, especially methamphetamines, but in more recent years has also come to encompass lucrative legitimate trade in agricultural goods, contract farming and transportation services.

The DKBA is, however, expected to lose some of its economic concessions once it joins the BGF and its soldiers become paid members of the Myanmar army, though militia leaders are expected to be allowed to maintain certain lucrative concessions as incentive to join the program. The DKBA itself has maintained among the local population that it will remain responsible for the development of Karen State.

Meanwhile, the armed assault is expected to intensify. More Myanmar army units have reportedly been moved closer to the border and analysts believe that when the current operation is completed fighting may shift to areas under the command of the KNLA's 6th Brigade in south Karen State. KNLA sources say fighting is also expected to resume in northern Karen State towards the end of the rainy season, in either September or October.

The upshot is that the Myanmar government looks set to gain control over all of central Karen State and a major stretch of the border with Thailand for the first time since the country achieved independence in 1948. Although democratic elections are planned for next year and the government has greater control over the region than ever before, greater militarization under an unpopular insurgent group-turned-government militia means stability for Karen State is far from assured.

Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist.
He may be reached at brianpm@comcast.net.