The Coming Age of Ethnic Reconciliation in Burma

Vikas Kumar | January 17, 2012

Recent developments in Burma have generated considerable optimism about the country’s long-impending democratization.

But will democracy foster ethnic reconciliation, essential for Burma’s domestic stability? A cross-country comparison with Sri Lanka and an examination of Burma’s demography and geographic distribution of resources indicate that despite sharing an otherwise similar trajectory with Sri Lanka, Burma’s emerging democracy could foster ethnic reconciliation, even after more than 60 years of ethnic insurgency.

Geographically, Burma belongs to mainland Southeast Asia. But culturally it belongs to the Theravada Buddhist world, along with countries like Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Sri Lanka. These countries are all alike insofar as their constitutions symbolically link the legitimacy of the state to Buddhism or, at the very least, extend special treatment to the majority Buddhist community.

But to the extent that each was affected by colonialism and communism/socialism, these Theravada countries can be classified into three groups: Thailand, which was never directly colonized and remained largely immune to communism; Laos and Cambodia, erstwhile French colonies that were strongly influenced by communism; and Sri Lanka and Burma, former British colonies, where socialism had considerable appeal. More recently in Burma, Thailand and Sri Lanka, minority insurgencies have contested the authority of the state. With these commonalities in mind (among others), Sri Lanka is clearly the Theravada country whose path most closely resembles that of Burma.

In Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese Buddhist-dominated state militarily defeated the Tamil ethnic minority insurgency, but then refused to honor its commitment to reconciliation. While the Sri Lankan Buddhist majority is unwilling to hold the government accountable in this regard, the Buddhist majority in a democratic Burma is unlikely to behave in a similar fashion.

At the moment, it seems the process of democratization in Burma is entirely controlled by the military regime. But the regime is introducing political reforms and trying to initiate peace talks with ethnic militias only because it is increasingly unable to sustain itself in the absence of popular support, while its legitimacy as the guardian of the majority Burmese Buddhists’ interests remains questionable. So, the democratization of Burma, whenever that happens, will be a people’s victory against an authoritarian state — much different from the case of Sri Lanka.

There are two more structural reasons why majority-minority relations will not be overtly antagonistic in a democratic Burma. First, Burma’s population is not divided into two antagonistic camps. This is unlike Sri Lanka, where there remains a clear division between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority in the north.

In contrast, insurgents in Burma are divided along ethnic lines — and none of the groups has managed to establish authority over the rest, as was the case in Sri Lanka, where the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam dominated the scene for more than two decades. Moreover, the Burmese Buddhists are also divided into a number of camps with fundamentally different approaches to the ethnic question. Second, unlike in Sri Lanka, the Burmese minority insurgent groups are not devoid of members from the majority community.

In short, religious, ethno-linguistic and political divides are not co-extensive in Burma. This has two consequences. First, it is highly unlikely that one political party will emerge as the sole representative of all the major ethnic minorities. So, the ethnic minorities are unlikely to pose a unified political threat to the Burmese Buddhists. Second, one political party is unlikely to maintain a majority with only the Burmese Buddhist vote. Parties representing the majority community would also need the support of ethnic minority parties. Consequently, political contests are unlikely to divide the polity into two clearly demarcated camps.

In addition, unlike the stronghold of the Sri Lankan Tamils, which is resource poor and located in one corner of the country, the strongholds of ethnic minorities are distributed along the entire periphery of Burma. The strongholds of Burmese ethnic minorities are not only resource-rich regions that should attract major international investment following democratization, but they also control Burma’s access to key neighbors like China, India and Thailand. Given the country’s decades-long economic stagnation, it is unlikely that the Burmese Buddhists will overlook this.

In sum, although demography and geographic distribution of resources failed to restrain ethnic conflicts immediately after independence, they will play a different role in a democratic Burma. A cursory acquaintance with Burma’s post-colonial history will convince the majority Burmese Buddhists of the impossibility and futility of any attempt to subjugate the minorities. This time, history should bear out the limits that demography and other factors place on ethno-political polarization and help foster ethnic reconciliation.

East Asia Forum

Vikas Kumar is an assistant professor at Azim Premji University in Bangalore.